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SSRF → reach internal Redis → write SSH key → RCE

Web app SSRF lets the attacker hit gopher://redis on the internal network. Inject CONFIG SET dir + dbfilename + SAVE to write an SSH authorized_keys onto the Redis host — log in as the Redis user.

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§ Kill-chainDrag · zoom · scroll

§ Context

Assumed environment: target web app has an SSRF primitive (URL fetcher / proxy / image library). An internal Redis instance accepts unauthenticated connections from app-server IPs.

§ Steps

  1. 01
    SSH in as redis userInitial Access
    T1078— Valid Accounts
  2. 02
    Identify SSRF primitive (gopher:// support)Lateral Movement
    W-SSRF— Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
  3. 03
    Reach internal Redis via gopher://Lateral Movement
    W-SSRF-INTERNAL— SSRF → Internal Service Exploit
  4. 04
    Continue internal pivotLateral Movement
    N-SSH-PROXY— SSH Dynamic / Reverse Tunnel
  5. 05
    SAVE → writes ~/.ssh/authorized_keysExecution
    DB-REDIS-RCE— Redis Unauth → RCE via CONFIG
  6. 06
    CONFIG SET dir / dbfilenameExecution
    DB-REDIS-RCE— Redis Unauth → RCE via CONFIG

§ References

§ Frequently asked

What is the "SSRF → reach internal Redis → write SSH key → RCE" attack path?
Web app SSRF lets the attacker hit gopher://redis on the internal network. Inject CONFIG SET dir + dbfilename + SAVE to write an SSH authorized_keys onto the Redis host — log in as the Redis user. It chains 6 steps drawn from real-world offensive-security techniques.
What starting position does this attack require?
The first step is SSH in as redis user (T1078) — a initial access primitive. Assumed environment: target web app has an SSRF primitive (URL fetcher / proxy / image library).
What is the final impact of this kill-chain?
The final step lands on CONFIG SET dir / dbfilename (DB-REDIS-RCE), which falls under Execution. From here, an operator typically pivots into post-exploitation or maintains persistence.
How can defenders detect or prevent this attack?
Detection and prevention vary per step. Refer to each linked MITRE ATT&CK entry under "References" — every technique on that page lists defensive controls, detection telemetry, and known threat-actor usage.

§ Related dossiers