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SIP extension brute → toll fraud / premium-rate exfil

Internet-exposed Asterisk / FreePBX with extensions whose password equals the extension number. Bruteforce a few, place expensive international / premium-rate calls.

Filed by AD Knowledge Base
§ Kill-chainDrag · zoom · scroll

§ Context

Assumed environment: target SIP server reachable on UDP/5060 (or TLS/5061) from the internet. Operator hasn't enforced fail2ban / strong passwords / outbound destination ACLs.

§ Steps

  1. 01
    Authenticate as compromised extensionInitial Access
    T1078Valid Accounts
  2. 02
    Enumerate valid extensionsDiscovery
    VOIP-SIP-SCANSIP Scanning & Enumeration
  3. 03
    svmap / sipvicious — find SIP serverDiscovery
    VOIP-SIP-SCANSIP Scanning & Enumeration
  4. 04
    REGISTER bruteforceCredential Access
    VOIP-SIP-BRUTESIP REGISTER Bruteforce
  5. 05
    Place high-value callsImpact
    VOIP-TOLL-FRAUDToll Fraud / Call Forwarding Abuse

§ References

§ Frequently asked

What is the "SIP extension brute → toll fraud / premium-rate exfil" attack path?
Internet-exposed Asterisk / FreePBX with extensions whose password equals the extension number. Bruteforce a few, place expensive international / premium-rate calls. It chains 5 steps drawn from real-world offensive-security techniques.
What starting position does this attack require?
The first step is Authenticate as compromised extension (T1078) — a initial access primitive. Assumed environment: target SIP server reachable on UDP/5060 (or TLS/5061) from the internet.
What is the final impact of this kill-chain?
The final step lands on Place high-value calls (VOIP-TOLL-FRAUD), which falls under Impact. From here, an operator typically pivots into post-exploitation or maintains persistence.
How can defenders detect or prevent this attack?
Detection and prevention vary per step. Refer to each linked MITRE ATT&CK entry under "References" — every technique on that page lists defensive controls, detection telemetry, and known threat-actor usage.