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← RegistryDossier · 5 steps · 4 edges

BGP prefix hijack → traffic interception

From a compliant origin AS, announce a more-specific or origin-spoofed prefix belonging to the victim. Internet routing converges on the attacker AS; traffic for that prefix flows through attacker for inspection / DoS.

Filed by AD Knowledge Base
§ Kill-chainDrag · zoom · scroll

§ Context

Assumed environment: attacker controls (legitimately or via compromise) a BGP-speaking AS that peers with major transit. RPKI ROAs not enforced by most peers — common for many regional ISPs.

§ Steps

  1. 01
    Control / compromise an ASResource Development
    T1583— Acquire Infrastructure
  2. 02
    Intercept / decrypt / DoS the trafficCredential Access
    T1557— Adversary-in-the-Middle
  3. 03
    Force certificate issuance via captured ACME validationCredential Access
    T1556— Modify Authentication Process
  4. 04
    Internet routes converge to attacker ASCredential Access
    T1040— Network Sniffing
  5. 05
    Announce more-specific victim prefixLateral Movement
    NET-BGP-HIJACK— BGP Route Hijack

§ References

§ Frequently asked

What is the "BGP prefix hijack → traffic interception" attack path?
From a compliant origin AS, announce a more-specific or origin-spoofed prefix belonging to the victim. Internet routing converges on the attacker AS; traffic for that prefix flows through attacker for inspection / DoS. It chains 5 steps drawn from real-world offensive-security techniques.
What starting position does this attack require?
The first step is Control / compromise an AS (T1583) — a resource development primitive. Assumed environment: attacker controls (legitimately or via compromise) a BGP-speaking AS that peers with major transit.
What is the final impact of this kill-chain?
The final step lands on Announce more-specific victim prefix (NET-BGP-HIJACK), which falls under Lateral Movement. From here, an operator typically pivots into post-exploitation or maintains persistence.
How can defenders detect or prevent this attack?
Detection and prevention vary per step. Refer to each linked MITRE ATT&CK entry under "References" — every technique on that page lists defensive controls, detection telemetry, and known threat-actor usage.

§ Related dossiers