Stolen credentials → no-MFA Snowflake → mass tenant exfil (2024)
Infostealer logs from third-party machines yielded credentials for many Snowflake tenants. Tenants without enforced MFA / IP allow-lists were directly queried; dozens of customer data sets exfiltrated.
§ Context
Assumed environment: target organisation uses Snowflake. MFA + IP allow-list not enforced tenant-wide. Some service accounts use static credentials without rotation, stored on user machines.
§ Steps
- 01Bulk export critical tablesExfiltrationT1041— Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- 02Sell / leak data; ransom tenantImpactT1486— Data Encrypted for Impact
- 03List databases / schemas / tablesDiscoveryT1087— Account Discovery
- 04Grep logs for *.snowflakecomputing.comReconnaissanceW-RECON-GITHUB-DORK— GitHub / GitLab Dorking
- 05Acquire infostealer logs (forum / Telegram)Resource DevelopmentT1583— Acquire Infrastructure
- 06Authenticate as tenant userCredential AccessAPT-SNOWFLAKE-2024— Snowflake Stolen-Credential Mass Theft (2024)
§ References
§ Frequently asked
- What is the "Stolen credentials → no-MFA Snowflake → mass tenant exfil (2024)" attack path?
- Infostealer logs from third-party machines yielded credentials for many Snowflake tenants. Tenants without enforced MFA / IP allow-lists were directly queried; dozens of customer data sets exfiltrated. It chains 6 steps drawn from real-world offensive-security techniques.
- What starting position does this attack require?
- The first step is Bulk export critical tables (T1041) — a exfiltration primitive. Assumed environment: target organisation uses Snowflake.
- What is the final impact of this kill-chain?
- The final step lands on Authenticate as tenant user (APT-SNOWFLAKE-2024), which falls under Credential Access. From here, an operator typically pivots into post-exploitation or maintains persistence.
- How can defenders detect or prevent this attack?
- Detection and prevention vary per step. Refer to each linked MITRE ATT&CK entry under "References" — every technique on that page lists defensive controls, detection telemetry, and known threat-actor usage.
§ Related dossiers
- Shared techniques3
Mass SMS phish → Okta-style portal → SaaS sprawl (0ktapus)
Wide SMS phishing campaign targeting employees of ~130 organisations with a single phishlet that captures Okta credentials + push approval. Mass automated logins to Twilio, MailChimp, DoorDash et al.
- Shared techniques3
Open MongoDB → dump every collection
Shodan-indexed MongoDB on 27017 with no auth. Connect, list databases, dump every collection. Often the second stage is a ransom note in a new 'README' collection.
- Shared techniques2
Unauth DICOM PACS → mass medical-image exfil
PACS server accepts unauthenticated C-FIND / C-MOVE on port 104 / 11112. Query for every study, pull every image — exfil hundreds of thousands of patient scans + DICOM metadata (PII).
- Shared techniques2
Insider admin panel coercion → mass account takeover (Twitter 2020)
Identify employees with access to an internal admin panel. SE / coerce one to use the panel to change target accounts' email + 2FA, then take them over.
- Shared techniques2
BACnet HVAC → disrupt building operations
BACnet on UDP/47808 is unauthenticated. From a foothold in corporate IT, write to HVAC controllers — over-cool a data centre, disable smoke evacuation, mess with elevators.
- Shared techniques2
MOVEit Transfer (CVE-2023-34362) → mass data exfil (Cl0p)
Pre-auth SQLi in MOVEit's web UI forges an admin session. .NET deserialisation chain drops a webshell as SYSTEM. Cl0p's 2023 mass-exfil playbook: download every file under /var/files.