TCC bypass → access Photos / Camera without consent
Inject into a process that already has Full Disk Access (e.g. backup utility, Terminal). Inherited TCC entitlement lets the attacker code read TCC-gated data — Photos, iMessage DB, Documents.
§ Context
Assumed environment: foothold as a standard user on macOS. At least one third-party app on the system has been granted FDA. SIP enabled (default) but the attacker has user-level write to the app bundle / dylib search path.
§ Steps
- 01User shellInitial AccessT1078— Valid Accounts
- 02Find app with FDA / Photos / Camera consentDiscoveryT1087— Account Discovery
- 03Exfil Photos / iMessage / DocumentsCredential AccessT1552— Unsecured Credentials
- 04Inherit entitlements → read TCC-protected dataDefense EvasionMAC-TCC-BYPASS— TCC Bypass
- 05Dylib hijack into the consented appPrivilege EscalationMAC-DYLIB-HIJACK— Dylib Hijack
§ References
- T1078Valid Accounts
- T1087Account Discovery
- T1552Unsecured Credentials
§ Frequently asked
- What is the "TCC bypass → access Photos / Camera without consent" attack path?
- Inject into a process that already has Full Disk Access (e.g. backup utility, Terminal). Inherited TCC entitlement lets the attacker code read TCC-gated data — Photos, iMessage DB, Documents. It chains 5 steps drawn from real-world offensive-security techniques.
- What starting position does this attack require?
- The first step is User shell (T1078) — a initial access primitive. Assumed environment: foothold as a standard user on macOS.
- What is the final impact of this kill-chain?
- The final step lands on Dylib hijack into the consented app (MAC-DYLIB-HIJACK), which falls under Privilege Escalation. From here, an operator typically pivots into post-exploitation or maintains persistence.
- How can defenders detect or prevent this attack?
- Detection and prevention vary per step. Refer to each linked MITRE ATT&CK entry under "References" — every technique on that page lists defensive controls, detection telemetry, and known threat-actor usage.
§ Related dossiers
- Shared techniques3
SSRF → IMDS → cloud creds → lateral
An image-fetcher / link-preview endpoint fetches attacker-controlled URLs server-side. Pivot to the cloud metadata service and steal the instance role credentials.
- Shared techniques2
Dev workstation → cloud backup keys → encrypted vault store (LastPass 2022)
Attacker compromised a single LastPass DevOps engineer's home machine via outdated Plex Media Server, harvested AWS keys for the encrypted-vault backup bucket, exfiltrated production vault data.
- Shared techniques2
z/OS TN3270 → RACF userID brute → mainframe shell
Internet-/intranet-exposed TN3270 mainframe terminal. Userids follow predictable HR scheme. Brute-force passwords; many environments allow short / dictionary passwords for legacy reasons.
- Shared techniques2
F5 BIG-IP iControl auth bypass (CVE-2022-1388) → root on LB
Connection-header smuggle bypasses iControl REST auth, command-injection RCE as root. Load balancers see all traffic — recover TLS keys, session cookies, internal SSO config.
- Shared techniques2
Slack token in CI log → DM history → vendor mailbox compromise
A CI run echoed a Slack xoxb-/xoxp- token. Use it to read DMs, harvest password-reset links and vendor invitations, pivot into the corporate mailbox.
- Shared techniques2
Spectre-class side-channel → cross-tenant memory leak
Pre-mitigation cloud VM lets a co-tenant trigger speculative loads from kernel / sibling-VM memory. Cache-side-channel measurements recover sensitive data, including TLS keys + cloud creds.