PMKID attack → offline crack with no client interaction
WPA2 PMKID can be extracted from a single association attempt with the AP — no client needed. hcxdumptool + hashcat -m 22000 yields the PSK if it's weak.
§ Context
Assumed environment: target WPA2 AP responds with RSN PMKID (most early-2018+ APs). No connected clients are required, useful for late-night assessments.
§ Steps
- 01Connect to WLANInitial AccessT1078— Valid Accounts
- 02hcxtools → hashcat .22000 formatExecutionT1059— Command and Scripting Interpreter
- 03hashcat -m 22000 wordlist + rulesCredential AccessT1110— Brute Force
- 04Continue internal foothold chainDiscoveryN-NMAP-INTERNAL— Internal Nmap Sweep
- 05hcxdumptool — capture PMKIDsCredential AccessWIFI-PMKID— WPA2 PMKID Attack
§ References
- T1078Valid Accounts
- T1059Command and Scripting Interpreter
- T1110Brute Force
§ Frequently asked
- What is the "PMKID attack → offline crack with no client interaction" attack path?
- WPA2 PMKID can be extracted from a single association attempt with the AP — no client needed. hcxdumptool + hashcat -m 22000 yields the PSK if it's weak. It chains 5 steps drawn from real-world offensive-security techniques.
- What starting position does this attack require?
- The first step is Connect to WLAN (T1078) — a initial access primitive. Assumed environment: target WPA2 AP responds with RSN PMKID (most early-2018+ APs).
- What is the final impact of this kill-chain?
- The final step lands on hcxdumptool — capture PMKIDs (WIFI-PMKID), which falls under Credential Access. From here, an operator typically pivots into post-exploitation or maintains persistence.
- How can defenders detect or prevent this attack?
- Detection and prevention vary per step. Refer to each linked MITRE ATT&CK entry under "References" — every technique on that page lists defensive controls, detection telemetry, and known threat-actor usage.
§ Related dossiers
- Shared techniques3
WPA2-PSK handshake capture + crack → LAN access
Deauth a connected client to force re-association, capture the 4-way handshake with airodump-ng, crack the PSK offline with hashcat.
- Shared techniques2
Industroyer2 IEC-104 substation hijack
Timed payload speaks IEC-60870-5-104 to substation RTUs at attacker-chosen hour; sends 'open breaker' commands across a substation, blackouts a grid section.
- Shared techniques2
io_uring UAF → modprobe_path overwrite → root
Use an io_uring UAF to land arbitrary kernel write, repoint /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe to an attacker binary, then trigger a kernel auto-modprobe — runs the binary as root.
- Shared techniques2
Dev workstation → cloud backup keys → encrypted vault store (LastPass 2022)
Attacker compromised a single LastPass DevOps engineer's home machine via outdated Plex Media Server, harvested AWS keys for the encrypted-vault backup bucket, exfiltrated production vault data.
- Shared techniques2
nf_tables UAF → kernel R/W → root
CVE-2024-1086-class nf_tables UAF reachable from a user namespace. Win the race with userfaultfd to land an attacker object in the freed slot, build a kernel R/W primitive, overwrite the current task's cred struct.
- Shared techniques2
BYOVD → kernel-level disable of EDR callbacks
From local admin, load a signed-but-vulnerable driver. Use its kernel primitive to walk the EDR's PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine entries and unlink them — EDR stops receiving events while still 'running'.