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DNS tunnel exfiltration in restricted egress

Outbound web is filtered, but DNS still resolves to the corporate forwarder. Use iodine / dnscat2 to tunnel a shell + exfil over DNS queries to an attacker-controlled authoritative server.

Filed by AD Knowledge Base
§ Kill-chainDrag · zoom · scroll

§ Context

Assumed environment: foothold on a tightly-firewalled internal host. Only egress allowed is recursive DNS. Attacker controls a public domain and runs iodine / dnscat2 server.

§ Steps

  1. 01
    Exfil sensitive data byte-by-byteExfiltration
    T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
  2. 02
    Foothold on host with no internetInitial Access
    T1078Valid Accounts
  3. 03
    Confirm DNS resolves attacker domainDiscovery
    T1018Remote System Discovery
  4. 04
    Start dnscat2 / iodine clientExfiltration
    DNS-TUNNEL-EXFILDNS Tunneling Exfil (iodine / dnscat2)
  5. 05
    C2 channel over DNSCommand and Control
    DNS-DOH-C2DNS-over-HTTPS C2 Channel

§ References

§ Frequently asked

What is the "DNS tunnel exfiltration in restricted egress" attack path?
Outbound web is filtered, but DNS still resolves to the corporate forwarder. Use iodine / dnscat2 to tunnel a shell + exfil over DNS queries to an attacker-controlled authoritative server. It chains 5 steps drawn from real-world offensive-security techniques.
What starting position does this attack require?
The first step is Exfil sensitive data byte-by-byte (T1041) — a exfiltration primitive. Assumed environment: foothold on a tightly-firewalled internal host.
What is the final impact of this kill-chain?
The final step lands on C2 channel over DNS (DNS-DOH-C2), which falls under Command and Control. From here, an operator typically pivots into post-exploitation or maintains persistence.
How can defenders detect or prevent this attack?
Detection and prevention vary per step. Refer to each linked MITRE ATT&CK entry under "References" — every technique on that page lists defensive controls, detection telemetry, and known threat-actor usage.

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