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WebView XSS → JS bridge → native code exec

WebView loads partially-attacker-controlled content (e.g. injected referral param) and exposes addJavascriptInterface — XSS in the page calls the bridge to run app-level code.

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§ Kill-chainDrag · zoom · scroll

§ Context

Assumed environment: target uses an Android WebView to render content with a parameter the attacker influences (deeplink, server response). addJavascriptInterface exposes a 'helper' object.

§ Steps

  1. 01
    Reach native code executionExecution
    T1059— Command and Scripting Interpreter
  2. 02
    Craft XSS that calls bridge methodsImpact
    W-XSS-DOM— DOM-Based XSS
  3. 03
    Reverse APK, find JS bridgeReconnaissance
    MOB-APK-REVERSE— APK Reverse Engineering
  4. 04
    Deliver via deeplink / referral paramInitial Access
    MOB-DEEPLINK-ABUSE— Android Deeplink / Intent Abuse
  5. 05
    Identify XSS sink in WebView contentImpact
    MOB-WEBVIEW-XSS— Android WebView XSS / JS Bridge

§ References

§ Frequently asked

What is the "WebView XSS → JS bridge → native code exec" attack path?
WebView loads partially-attacker-controlled content (e.g. injected referral param) and exposes addJavascriptInterface — XSS in the page calls the bridge to run app-level code. It chains 5 steps drawn from real-world offensive-security techniques.
What starting position does this attack require?
The first step is Reach native code execution (T1059) — a execution primitive. Assumed environment: target uses an Android WebView to render content with a parameter the attacker influences (deeplink, server response).
What is the final impact of this kill-chain?
The final step lands on Identify XSS sink in WebView content (MOB-WEBVIEW-XSS), which falls under Impact. From here, an operator typically pivots into post-exploitation or maintains persistence.
How can defenders detect or prevent this attack?
Detection and prevention vary per step. Refer to each linked MITRE ATT&CK entry under "References" — every technique on that page lists defensive controls, detection telemetry, and known threat-actor usage.

§ Related dossiers