← RegistryDossier · 5 steps · 4 edges
SIP extension brute → toll fraud / premium-rate exfil
Internet-exposed Asterisk / FreePBX with extensions whose password equals the extension number. Bruteforce a few, place expensive international / premium-rate calls.
Filed by AD Knowledge Base
§ Kill-chainDrag · zoom · scroll
§ Context
Assumed environment: target SIP server reachable on UDP/5060 (or TLS/5061) from the internet. Operator hasn't enforced fail2ban / strong passwords / outbound destination ACLs.
§ Steps
- 01Authenticate as compromised extensionInitial AccessT1078— Valid Accounts
- 02Enumerate valid extensionsDiscoveryVOIP-SIP-SCAN— SIP Scanning & Enumeration
- 03svmap / sipvicious — find SIP serverDiscoveryVOIP-SIP-SCAN— SIP Scanning & Enumeration
- 04REGISTER bruteforceCredential AccessVOIP-SIP-BRUTE— SIP REGISTER Bruteforce
- 05Place high-value callsImpactVOIP-TOLL-FRAUD— Toll Fraud / Call Forwarding Abuse
§ References
- T1078Valid Accounts
§ Frequently asked
- What is the "SIP extension brute → toll fraud / premium-rate exfil" attack path?
- Internet-exposed Asterisk / FreePBX with extensions whose password equals the extension number. Bruteforce a few, place expensive international / premium-rate calls. It chains 5 steps drawn from real-world offensive-security techniques.
- What starting position does this attack require?
- The first step is Authenticate as compromised extension (T1078) — a initial access primitive. Assumed environment: target SIP server reachable on UDP/5060 (or TLS/5061) from the internet.
- What is the final impact of this kill-chain?
- The final step lands on Place high-value calls (VOIP-TOLL-FRAUD), which falls under Impact. From here, an operator typically pivots into post-exploitation or maintains persistence.
- How can defenders detect or prevent this attack?
- Detection and prevention vary per step. Refer to each linked MITRE ATT&CK entry under "References" — every technique on that page lists defensive controls, detection telemetry, and known threat-actor usage.