← LibraryTechnique entry
AI-PROMPT-INJECTInitial Access
Direct Prompt Injection
User-supplied input contains instructions that override the system prompt — "Ignore previous instructions and …" classic.
§ Where this technique fits
AI-PROMPT-INJECT is catalogued under the Initial Access tactic of the offensive-security kill-chain. It appears in 2 approved dossiers in the registry, typically at step 1 on average.
§ Dossiers chaining this technique
- step 1 / 6
Multi-agent confused-deputy → tool-call escalation
User-facing agent has limited tools; back-end planning agent has powerful tools (shell, file system). Prompt injection in user input → user agent → back-end agent. The back-end runs the attacker's intent under the planner's higher trust.
- step 1 / 5
Direct prompt injection → exfil another user's data
Multi-tenant LLM assistant. Attacker's prompt overrides instructions and tricks the model into emitting another user's session content / RAG-cached data.
§ What commonly comes next
- 01Multi-Agent Collusion / Confused Deputyseen 1×AI-AGENT-MULTI · Privilege Escalation
- 02System Prompt Extractionseen 1×AI-SYS-PROMPT-LEAK · Discovery
- 03Training Data Extractionseen 1×AI-TRAINING-EXFIL · Collection