Rogue DHCP → DNS poisoning → MITM
Bring up a faster DHCP server on the segment; new clients get attacker as gateway + DNS — strip HTTPS, capture creds, inject payloads.
§ Context
Assumed environment: attacker is on the same broadcast domain as victims. No DHCP snooping enabled on the switch. Clients honour short lease times.
§ Steps
- 01Foothold on LANInitial AccessT1078— Valid Accounts
- 02Crack captured NetNTLMv2Credential AccessT1110— Brute Force
- 03Strip + log HTTPS / capture NTLMCredential AccessT1557.001— LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
- 04Start rogue DHCP (Responder / Yersinia)Credential AccessN-DHCP-ROGUE— Rogue DHCP Server
- 05Become DNS for new clientsCredential AccessN-MDNS-POISON— mDNS / SSDP Poisoning
§ References
- T1078Valid Accounts
- T1110Brute Force
- T1557.001LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
§ Frequently asked
- What is the "Rogue DHCP → DNS poisoning → MITM" attack path?
- Bring up a faster DHCP server on the segment; new clients get attacker as gateway + DNS — strip HTTPS, capture creds, inject payloads. It chains 5 steps drawn from real-world offensive-security techniques.
- What starting position does this attack require?
- The first step is Foothold on LAN (T1078) — a initial access primitive. Assumed environment: attacker is on the same broadcast domain as victims.
- What is the final impact of this kill-chain?
- The final step lands on Become DNS for new clients (N-MDNS-POISON), which falls under Credential Access. From here, an operator typically pivots into post-exploitation or maintains persistence.
- How can defenders detect or prevent this attack?
- Detection and prevention vary per step. Refer to each linked MITRE ATT&CK entry under "References" — every technique on that page lists defensive controls, detection telemetry, and known threat-actor usage.
§ Related dossiers
- Shared techniques2
Dev workstation → cloud backup keys → encrypted vault store (LastPass 2022)
Attacker compromised a single LastPass DevOps engineer's home machine via outdated Plex Media Server, harvested AWS keys for the encrypted-vault backup bucket, exfiltrated production vault data.
- Shared techniques2
RFID badge clone → after-hours access
Brush-pass a target employee with a long-range RFID reader, capture their HID/iCLASS card data, clone to a blank — return after hours to badge into restricted floors.
- Shared techniques2
WPA2-PSK handshake capture + crack → LAN access
Deauth a connected client to force re-association, capture the 4-way handshake with airodump-ng, crack the PSK offline with hashcat.
- Shared techniques2
PMKID attack → offline crack with no client interaction
WPA2 PMKID can be extracted from a single association attempt with the AP — no client needed. hcxdumptool + hashcat -m 22000 yields the PSK if it's weak.
- Shared techniques2
mitm6 IPv6 SLAAC → NTLM relay → DA
Even when IPv4 is hardened, Windows clients prefer IPv6 with default DHCPv6. mitm6 makes the attacker the IPv6 DNS server, advertises wpad, and relays the captured NTLM to LDAPS for RBCD.
- Shared techniques2
802.1X NAC bypass via printer MAC spoof
Plug into the LAN, sniff a printer / IP-phone MAC, clone it on your laptop, get full LAN access via MAC-Auth-Bypass — bypass NAC entirely.